Shock Treatments by Bhagwati, Jagdish N.
Hamsun imd Bergman. We're reminded
of those fraitght dramas, in many cases a
tug between a stnali nnmher of people,
set beside a body of water. Whether an
intimate lake, or a cove in a fjord, or a
njcky shoreline on a soimd, this setting
is a key element in the nnfolding stoi y.
Life hy the water, with a towboat or a sail-
hoai tied tip, (jr with a little steamer at
tbe town pier, and with a Hag flying
somewhere, seems to be .synonymous
with smnnier itself, and summer is when
diama generally happens in Scandina-
vian art.
In Kobke's hands, relations between
people are not the contest of wills they
wotilti be in the work of these later fig-
tires. Yet his painiing in the Reinhart
Foundation, with snnlight and shadow
playing over tlie child, tbe tipright
women and the men bent down in tbe
boat, might be a primal Nordic scene.
Flere. in acorn form, is the fhst appear-
ance of that drama abotti the emotional
temperattire of a family or a faniilylike
gT'oup of peojile. Tbe pictttte makes you
feel that, though he led his life as a
perennial son, and still makes Danes
wonder how mucb importance to give
him, Kdbke was, at least in tbe largei'




Poland's Jump to the Market Economy
by Jeffrey Sachs
(MIT Press, 160 pp., $19,951
I t is iionic that Jeffrey Sachs'scelebratory account of eco-nomic "shock therapy" inPoland an ives just as the same
therapy seems to have foundered on tbe
legendary shoals of Russia. .-Vfter all. if
Russia's failtirc was inspired by Poland's
success, it may be that Poland lias fhially
managed to repay Russia for all the n otj-
hie that Russia has visited UJJOTI Poland
in the pasi. Now that the \irtues of shock
therapy are no longer taken for granted
by all reasonable men and women, a real
debate over its wisdom can begin. Tbe
stakes of this discussion are bigb: only a
dispassionate analysis of what went
wrong in Russia yestei day can illuminate
tbe problems that await tis there today.
As is often ihe case wben great issues
and arliciilate [jrotagonists are involved,
the analysis of shock therapy has been
bedeviled by language. The proponents
of sbock therapy are masters of rhetoric;
and tbey have often relied on attractive
phrases and misleading analogies to
advance their argumeni. The phrase
itself suggests a drastic hut necessary cor-
rective to unmanageable disoider; and
"big hang"—aiuttber tei ni in the shock
tlieiapists' lexicon—suggests nothing
less than the creation of the universe.
Both imply that we must ptish abead at
full speed; wben tbere is chaos, and
everything is a mess, surely that is the
rigbt thing to do. Gradtialism, hy con-
trast, suggests procrastination, a theory
of latiieness.
Tbe debate over economic reform
often becomes an angry exchange of
analogies. One side claims tbat you can
only cross a chasm in a single leap. Tbe
other side retorts tbat unless you are
Indiana Jones, you drop a bridge. Tben
again, the shock therapists argue, if you
want to cut a dog's lail, you do it with
one slash of the knife, not bit hy bit. /\iid
the gradualists reply that you train a dog
by setting incrementally escalating
heights fbi' him tojttnip.
Tbe sbock therapists, who strike
rather romantic figures on a dreary pol-
icy landscape, bave succeeded in sug-
gesting that economists who advocate
gradualisni ai'e knaves or worse. But the
truth is tbat tbe optimal speed of any
reform is an isstte of nutch (ontroversy
in theoretical research today, and tbere
is no basis for the sweeping presimiption
tbat the more speed, the better. Indeed,
gradualist thinking has a distinguished
past in economics. Adam Stnith, whose
credentials on the subject of markets are
naturally indisptitahle, wrote in The
Wmllh nfSalions:
It ni;iy soint-liiiu's Ix- a in;ittcr of delibera-
tion, liuw far, or in wbat manner it is
jtropei- to restore the free importation of
foreign goods. . . wben ]jarii< ular iiiamifiic-
turers, by means of high duties oi' probibi-
tioiis uptjn all foreign goods which ctjme
into ctinipeniitin wiib tbeni, bave been so
far extended as lo finploy a great mulii-
nide of bands. Hnmanity may in this case
rc(|uire tbat freedom of trade should be
restored only by slow fria<fu;iti(nis, and witb
a j^ood deal of i('sei\e and {iiriiin,s]KTtion.
And in a similar spirit, Keynes wrote in
19^3 of tbe danger of haste, citing, iron-
ically enough, tbe exatnple of Russia
movitig toward socialism:
Paul Valery's aphoiiMn is wortb (jiioting—
"Politital conflicts distort and disturb the
people's sfit.sr of disiinclion between mat-
ters of iinporiaiue and tnalteis t»f turgency."
The economic transition of a society is a
ibing lo be accoinplisbed slowly.... We
have a fearful exani]jle in Rnssia today of
the evils of insane and unnecessary baste.
Tbe sacrifices and losses of transition will
be vastly greater if llie pace is forced For
it is of tbe nature of economic processes to
be rooicd in time. A rapid transition will
involve so mucb pure destruction of wealtb
that tbe new state of affairs will be, at first,
far worse tban tbe old, and tbe grand
expctimcnt will be discredited.
One (hing is clear: tbe debate over
shock therapy c annot he condttcted witb
catchpbrases atid sound hiles. It is only
when these distiactions are dismissed
tbat the importatit issues come into view.
The actual content of tbe reform strat-
egy in Poland and Russia, and its con-
trastitig forttines in the two countries,
are subjects that reqtiire seriotts itivesti-
gation. Sachs has ad\ised both the Polish
and Russian governments, and so be is
an invaluable guide ihrongb these dense
thickets. His little book presents a pro-
tagonist's view witb admirable clarity and
conviction. Tbe main subject of his anal-
ysis is Poland, hut he draws parallels
betweeti the "failed" policies of Russia
and Polatid prior to shock tberapy, and
argues for the method's promise in Rus-
sia after its success in Poland.
O f course, Sacbs's conftdent])iescription for Russiac()titia.sts sbarply witb Rtis-sia's sorry cotiditioti lodav.
John Kenneth (iaibraith once said wittily
of ati ecotioinist foe that his misfortune
was to bave his theories tried (and to
bave thetu fail); and Sachs's misfortune
may he tbat bis theories were so success-
ful in Poland that tbey were tried again
in Russia. Wliat was hold in Poland
turned out to be rasb in Russia. Poland
eai tied Saclis a place in history. Btit Rtts-
sia overwlielnied him, layitig waste, not
for tbe lust titne, to a great ambition.
To tmderstand what happened, it is
necessary to trace tbe decline and disin-
tegration of tbe Polisb and Soviet
economies before tbe introduction of
shock tberapy. Indeed, modern eco-
!ioniic bistory wotild do well to distin-
guish among four historical phases:
(I) the decline imder socialism; (2) the
deepening crisis as foreigti horrowitig
without reforms led to excessive debt
MARCH 28, 1994 THE NEW REPUBLIC 39
btirdens; (3) the disintegration under
"market socialism," when market re-
forms were attempted within the Social-
ist framework; and (4) shock therapy,
with its benign consequences in Poland
and malign outcomes in Rtissia.
The eeonoiuic decline under social-
ism has been well-docun\enied. Scholars
have long noted that the Easiern bloc's
high rates of investment unfailingly pro-
duced few results. The blood, .sweat and
tears were to no avail: growth rates plum-
meted; and effieiency and technical
innovation, the twin sources of increased
prodtictivity from investment, were
incompatible with a regime that decried
initiative and ignored incentives.
F aeed with the chillingprospect of economic de-cline, [he Socialist regimesof Gorbachev in Moscow
and Gierek in Warsaw passed through
two phases of "reform." Initially, both
leaders tried to preserve the inherited
economic system. They urged workers
to work harder, and they sought to
improve technology' and productivity
with high levels of foreign borrowing.
But the results were exactly what
economists had earlier witnessed in the
developing countries: huge foreign
debts were contracted with little eco-
nomic payoff. The influx of capital
bought a little time, but it burdenecl the
economy with interest and repayment
bills that simply could not be met. Con-
sider an impoverished peasant who bor-
rows and invests with little return and
then Finds himself hopelessly indebted.
For Poland and the Soviet Union, the
results were mnch the same.
Thus began the phase of "market
socialism": market reforms carried out
within the confines of continued state
ownership. State-owned firms were now
allowed to "set wages, inputs and outputs
(but typically, not prices)." Sachs con-
tends that these reforms were not merely
incomplete and inadequate; because
they were undertaken without privatiza-
tion, he believes they contained the
seeds of disaster.
Both Poland and Russia did indeed
take nosedives under market socialism.
But was the lack of privatization really to
blame? Common sense stiggesLs that pri-
vatization should yield greater gains by
allowing more play to the proFit motive
as market incentives are introduced. But
losing these incremental gains is not the
same thing as losing your shirt. Are we
truly faced with the option of going all
the way or going down the tubes? Not
really.
Regardless of privatization, Poland's
and Russia's reforms could not have
been expected to produce signiFicant
results. A key problem, Sachs notes, was
that the born-again reformers were still
prisoners of the assumptiou that compe-
tition (which, in principle, is compatible
with state-owned enterprises acting
tmder new rules) did not matter. Restric-
tions on new enterprises, import con-
trols and a host of other interferences
continued, and nipped competition in
the bud. Reforms reinforce each other;
one, without others, will not work.
B ut this does not explainthe collapse of marketsocialism. To do so, Sachsfollows a different line of
argument, proposing that the liabilities
of state ownership were exacerbated by
the growth of democracy. In other
words, glasnost helped to kill pere-
stroika. This is a eounterintuitive and
interesting thesis, because the normal
presmnption at the time was that
democracy would briug immediate and
palpable beneFits to a people that had
been starved of freedoms for too long.
These benefits, it was thought, would
buy Gorbachev the time to brii\g the
economic reforms along in a gradual,
measured way. But the general consen-
sus today seems to be that Gorbachev's
reforms and Gierek's economic reforms
failed because the terror had died.
Reforms freed gigantic state-owned
enterprises from the "command" system
that communism worked with an iron
fist. At the same time, the full play of the
market and the invisible hand were not
in place. Hence discipline broke down
and so did the economy.
This view is not original with Sacbs,
bui he states it well:
L'ndtT Ihe old "command tconomy,"
before the Gorbachev reforms, enterprise
policies were conirolled by central fiat,
hacked up by threat of force against work-
ers and managers who tried to evade the
commands. When the commands, and the
threat of force, were {mercifully) removed
in the enierprise reforms in the second half
of the 1980s, managers and workers
attempted, not surprisingly, to increase
thoir incomes at the expense ot the siatc hy
absorbing whatever income flow and what-
ever assets they could from state enter-
prises. They demanded higher wages and
stripped assets through various means—
either overt or covert.
This argument does not persuade me, at
least in its general form. Sachs seems to
think that wage explosions and asset
stripping happened because "when
there are no capitalists, there is nobody
to represent the interests of capital." If
state-owned enterprises had been
replaced with private enterprise, he
believes, these rude occtirrences would
have heen avoided. But asset stripping,
or "looting," is also a fact of life in capi-
talist systems with private ownership.
Thus the economists (ieorge Akerlof
and Paul Romer have argtied quite per-
suasively that our own s&r crisis was in
no small measure the result of straight-
forward villainy, and not simply due to
unwise financial deregulation. Nor are
excessive wage demands a rare problem
for capitalist societies.
Sachs also overlooks an important
aspect of market socialism. Once eco-
nomic decision-making was shifted to
the state-owned enterprises, and there
was less retribtuion from the state, it
became a lot easier to direct supplies
and outputs to more profitable tises.
Indeed, as the Sovietologist Padma Desai
noted SL-\eKil years ago, the bieakdown
of the command system did lead Soviet
farms to ignore the state's procurement
demands and to sell their products
instead in open rural markets that
fetched higher prices. As fartners'
incomes rose, agricultural production
iticreased. Meanwhile state-stipplied
tirban shops began to rtm out of food as
procurement flagged. One soliuion to
this problem would have been to direct
domestic effort and foreign Fmancial
and technical assistance to building a
better transportation system so that
profit-seeking entrepreneurs cotild shift
their rural supplies to more profitable
urban markets.
I t's important to recognize thatthe ills of market socialismmight have occurred evenwith privatization; and that
some good did occur even without it. In
short, it was not the absence of privatiza-
tion that led to the implosion of Poland
and Russia. And ihai is a good thing. If
market reforms could not be ptirstied
without privatization in place, we would
be in deep and itnmanageable trouble.
Privatization takes time, just as building
an effective population control policy or
extending agrictiltural assistance pro-
grams takes lime. The critical problem
was, rather, that neither Gierek nor Gor-
bachev had the instruments of social
policy and of monetary and Fiscal con-
trol in place as they experimented with
market reforms.
If you shift to markets, you deserve to
get micro-efflciency. But to reap the
rewards iu good measure, yoti have to
use the social instrtuneiiLs that go with
markets. A social safely nel and acljust-
meut assistance are necessary to reform,
especially if you expect enterprises to
respond to price signals and lay off work-
ers when required. The shift from a soci-
ety of entitlement to a society of oppor-
tunity, and hence fiom total security to
total insectirity in one's working life, cre-
ates the kind of fear thai Americans wit-
nessed in their own country during the
N.\rrA debate. American workers, com-
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ing ot'i a decade when real wages fell,
were extiaoidinarily resistant to the
administration's appeal for their sup-
port, becau.se they knew that freer trade
means greater fltix and adds to insecu-
lity.
A .sucressftil shift lo a marketeconomy requires thesocial instrtimeius thatcapitalism ha.s evolved over
the last century. L'nforttinately, these
iiistrtiments were not readily available
ill Moscow and Warsaw for the simple
rt^ ason thai ihey liad been tinnecessary
in a Socialist society. Ironically, mone-
tary policy also slipped from govern-
ment hands even though the mone-
tarists were as much in charge tinder
comintinism in its heyday as they were
in Milton Friedman's Utopias. The mar-
kei Socialists might have tried lo halt
the wage explosion with lough mone-
tary policies; but they failed to do so. In
place ot monetary restraint, Poland and
Russia practiced an accommodating
monetary policy that indulged the wage
explosion by printing the money neces-
sary to pay for it.
Thi.s iailure of macroeconomic policy
had diOeient causes in Poland and Rus-
sia, (iierek simply did not have ihe polit-
ical legitimacy to enforce strict discipline
on the workers. Under Gorbachev this
legitimacy existed, al lea.st for a lime, but
il did not help. Wlien Yeltsin took con-
tiol of Rtissian revenues, Gorbachev had
to print money to pay for So\'iet expen-
ditures, and a profligate monetary policy
inevitably resulted. Gorbachev had liltle
choice in the matter.
(Contrary to Sachs's conclusion, the
absence of privatization was not the
"fatal Haw" that undei mined Gor-
bachev's and Gierek's reforms. If there
was a fatal flaw, it was the absence of the
social and macroeconomic policy instru-
ments that are essential to the effective
functioning of market capitalism. In any
case, markci socialism did not work, and
it became cleai" that a change of course
was in order.
It may be that Sachs's apocalyptic view
of market socialism predisposed him to
drastic measures when he arrived in
Poland in [une 1989 at the invitation of
Solidarity. It is also possible that Sachs
was simply following orders; he writes
that Solidarity instructed him to draw up
"a program of rapid and comprehensive
change." In August 19H9. the Mazo-
wiecki government appointed as its
depiuy ptinie minister for the economy
the now celebrated Leszek Balcerowicz
to spearhead siicb a program. It is hard
lo decide who led whom by the hand. It
is certain, however, that they walked
hand in hand.
The Balcerowicz plan that resulted
must be clearly understood, for it is the
essence of shock therapy. Sachs empha-
sizes the plan's dramatic and "holistic"
features:
I Poland h;idj lo brt-ak decisively iviili llu-
(^oiniTiiinist sysiein, to end litdfw/iy tr/orm,
and ... to jump to Ike market ironomy |niv iial-
ics). The goal wa.s lo create an economy "in
the s[\'le of Wcsicrn Europe," ba.sed on pii-
vate ownership, free markets and iniegra-
lion into world markets. Tlie plan also com-
bined long-ierm niaik<-t reform with a
short-run emergency staliili/ation program
to end the incipient hyperinflation.
Like other economists, Sachs defines
hyperinflation as a monthly rise iti prices
of' 50 percent or more. The phe-
nomenon is a familiar one in South
America, where it calls to mind the mag-
ical realist Fiction of Garcia Marquez. But
it is virtually unknown here or in India,
where rates tjf inflation reaching even
two digits lead to corrective action—an
approach to macroeconomics more con-
sonant with the ttanquility of ihe village
of Malgudi in the fiction of R. K.
Narayan. Americans can get a better feel
for the phenomenon from the advice to
take a taxi instead of a bus under hyper-
inflation, since you pay for a bus ride
when it starts and for a taxi ride when it
ends.
No macroeconotnist will quarrel with
the proposition that hyperinflation has
to be attacked swiftly and surely. This
reqtiires a ruthless assatilt on the btidget
deficit, and on the printing of money
that (lnances it. Fiscal and monetary
policies must be geared towatd the task
of macroeconomic stabilization. And so
iti 1990 Poland initiated a drastic plan of
action: food and other hotisehold subsi-
dies were slashed or eliminated entirely;
cheap ctedits to industry disappeared;
and ceilings on borrowing were set.
The novelty of Sachs's plan, however,
lay elsewhere. He insisted [hat reforms
in the incentive structtue of the Polish
economy must be carried otit with eqtial
speed. Consider the convertibility of the
zluty. The introduction of effective inter-
national competition is impossible,
economists agree, without a convertible
currency that enables traders to import
cheaper foreign goods whenever domes-
tic good.s are partictilariy expensive. But
Sachs rejected the conventional wisdom
which held that a quick transition to
convertibility for Poland was impossible
since Western Europe had taken a
decade after the Second World War to
reach convertibility and most developing
countries were still afflicted witb incon-
vertible tui ren(ies. Instead, Sachs per-
suaded Poland to inttoduce convertibil-
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exchiingf rale at an attractivt-ly low level
and backing it up with a stabilization
fund tbat guarded against speculation.
As a result, Poland maintained a stable
exchange I'ate throughout 1990, even as
its cm rency became convertible.
Shock therapy also mandated a full
liberati/auon of prices. It was expected
that prices would rise steeply onee, and
then tbey would stabilize as tough mone-
tary and fiscal policies cmplied the fuel
tanks driving hyperinflation. At the same
time, wage discipline was imposed
through a tax on wage increases tliat
exceeded a norm: the so-called "|topi-
wek" tax. It was expeeted that tbis curb
on raises would limit unemployment
and reduce the need for monetary
restraint, sinee the government would
not have to combat wage increases by
reftising to print more money.
Sachs argues persuasively that this
therapy produced dramatic results.
Prices rose initially by 77 percent in Jan-
uary, by 16 percent in February and
then by less than 4 percent a montb in
tbe two years afterward. The exchange
rate was stable. Foreign exchange
reserves actually increased. (Confidence
in the currency rose, and Poles began
exchanging dollars for ziotys. But the
bad news, as feared by opponents of
shock therapy, was that unemployment
rose dramatically. It increased from an
average ot'^.rt percent in 1990 to an aver-
age of 9.2 percent in U)91 and to an
average of 12.8 percent in 1992. I sus-
pect that the trtie rate of unemployment
in Poland was even higher, since firms
probably kept mostly idle workers on
their rolls who sbared work with each
other in a makeshift way. Tbe old gag
from the years of conmiunism was still
good: asked wbeie the unemployed had
gone, a local wit replied that they were
working.
Of course, luieniployment rates were
high in Western Etnope as well. And they
were liigh in Easlern European countries
that did not undergo shock therapy. But
the increase in unemployment in Poland
was siuely not unrelated to sbock ther-
apy. And the increase was dramatic de-
spite the "popiwek" tax that a Solidarity-
backed government had succeeded in
imposing on Poland's workers, ll is not
sin prising, then, that the social contract
began to fray. In the parliamentary elec-
tions of September 1993, Polish voters
ga\e less than 12 percent of the vote to
the proreform Suchoka government,
while returning to the legislature former
(-onimunists and future fascists who
added up lo more than a third of the new
Parliament. The many successes of tbe
BaUerowicz reforms were overshadowed
in (he political marketplace by the pain
attributed to the therapy.
Ibis unfortunate turn of events
should give us the clues we need as to
why shock therapy failed in Russia. In
Poland the political preconditions exist-
On a Marriage
So you have cbosen the way of the swan;
the way, perhaps, that is not nattiral
to everyone, bul I will not harp on
about heron, blue bird oi' dotterel,
nor how tbe male flycatcher pairs
with two females, keeping a mile between,
so neither cops how the other sbares
the same philandering gentleman.
Did yon know the life-coupling way
of the swan is also that of tbe crow?
And there'll be crow-black days
you'll caw at each other witb !)lind gusto.
But there'll be other times when you'll sing
the duet of the black-collared barbet
with the fust part of die song sung
by one 8c tbe second by the oiher mate.
'We wish you now many such duet days
8c sing for you like the red-eyed vireo
who sings nonstop through the summer blaze
on this day you take the way of swan Sc crow.
GREG DELANTY
ed for shock iherapy lo be given a fair
chance. In Russia the political precondi-
tions appear not to have existed at all. In
Jantiary 1992 Yegor (iaidar. Russia's
deputy prime minister, annotmct'd a pro-
gram of reform that paralleled Poland's.
Claidar's plan, devised with Sachs's assis-
tance, was to citt Russia's budget deficit
from an officially estimated 17 percent of
gross domestic product all the way to
zero in just fbiu" months. There was no
consensus in support of this bold pro-
posal. The Russian economist Yasin Yev-
geni has said that the plan was conceived
and anin)inued "Soviet-style"; no efforts
were made to consult with Parliament <jr
with the regional governments or with
the people. At the same time, as in
Poland, nearly all price controls were
lifted, with tbe result that prices immedi-
ately rose by 300 percent.
The price increases cut deeply into
the population's cash savings, which
were widely treasured because most
other productive assets could not be
legally held. Meanwhile the link between
wages and prices was severed by the
removal t)f wage indexation for state
employees. These developments magni-
fied the widespread, and undetstand-
able, fear that a rise in unemployment
would follow from the proposed budget
cuts.
I n a country accustomed tofull employment, in which fullemployment was not only aprinciple of eccmomics but
also a principle of culture, tbe fear of
joblessness went very deep. For a Rus-
sian workf^ r, the loss of employment
raised a specter of personal disaster that
went beyond the loss of wages, [ust as
bealth instuance in the United States is
linked to employment by a strange quirk
of wartime history, so much else is
linked to <»ne's employment in Russia.
Of course, no social safety net was yet in
place: unemployment instuance was still
being worked at. But even witb a safety
net, workers had little reason to assume
that new jobs would become available to
them. Meanwhile, a long tradition of
paternalism toward workers possibly
reinforced the hostility of factory man-
agers to economic change.
To be sure, many converts to shock
therapy were aware of the pain that their
policies would cause. But it was their
expectation thai large doses of foreign
aid would ease that pain. Sachs himself
was a party to the so-called "Grand Bar-
gain" or "Harvard Plan." which pro-
posed that foreign countries deliver as
nutch as $30 billion per annum for five
years. Though he later withdrew from its
sponsorship, be did not abandon tbe
niunbers. A funny story made the
rotmds at tbe time among Russian
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cxpt'i ts who were disconcerted by the
fact that the Harvard plan had lieen ptit
lot^ether by Americans who had little
knowledge of Russia's Iiistory, institu-
tions or langtiage. Someone asks an
American reformer, "How did you
become an expert on Russia?" He says, "I
have been there five times." And llie
Russian replies, "And if yoti have heen to
(he l^athrooni live limes, are you qiiali-
lied to be a tirologist?" But the real prol)-
lem was not that the authors of the
gtaridiose plan knew little about Russia;
it was that they did not know enotigh
abotu [heir own habitat. Ntimbcrs stub
a.s $.S0 billion were simply nut of bounds.
How could so nuuli aid possibly have
bi'en mobilized?
T he stipporters of shocktherapy in Rtissia weresadly miscalctilatiiig theaid they cotild get, confus-
ing exhoitations with expectations.
Indeed, when shock therapy was
annotLnced in January 1992, Russia was
not even a member of the IMF, and
(ieorge Bush had not yet committed
himself firmly to any aid at all. The
(oniplaint that the IMF did not de-
liver what it eventtially promised is fac-
Iiially correct. But it is incorrect to
imply, as Sachs has implied, that this
was why the plan did not sticceed.
For sliock therapy was already fail-
ing, antl the system was leturning to fis-
cal and monetary chaos, and so the
IMF held up the release of funds until
some fiscal discipline was restored.
This is standard IMF policy every-
where in the world, and it stirely has
merit.
In the end, the Russian system simply
cotild not accommodate the demands
that shock therapy made upon it. And
so shock therapy was reversed, return-
ing the regime to targe budget deficits
and high rates of inflation. Political and
economic realities on the grt)inid drove
ihe moderates in Parliament to join
hands wiih the extremists. Meanwhile
the ti'clmociats who were wedded to
shock therapy branded all who opposed
it as Communists, reactionaries, rejec-
tionists and worse. The eventtial con-
frontation between the Russian Parlia-
ment and ilu" Yeltsin governmeni was a
tragedy whose script liad been wiitten
iinwiitingly by the shot k therapists. The
self-deluding world in which they lived
was further in evidence when Anders
Aslimd. a former Swedish diplomat doti-
bling with Sachs as an adviser to Gaidar,
wrote in The New York Times, jwai before
ihe disasttous election of December 12,
of the certain victory that awaited the
reformers.
Wotild more modest efforts to cut the
budget deficit and slow the inflation
have been more acceptable to tlie cotm-
try and more readily supported by Ibr-
eign assistance? Such a course was feasi-
ble. Most analysts agree that Rtissia faced
high inflation, not hyperinflation, at the
time of tlie shift to shock thcrajjy, and
that this problem allowed a gradual
assatilt. The gradtialists contend that the
shock therapists achieved too little in
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F amily is an embatlled coun-try stu rounded by moats inMavis Gallant's precariousworld. The characters in
her stories who escape its confines—
castoffs or deserters c:ommitting acts of
treason—are wary adventtiiers, uncer-
tain if they are being rescued or taken
prisoner. When her younger sister gets
married and prejjares to embark on a
new life in "The Chosen Htisband,"
one of four linked stories in the latest
collection, Bei the ('arette looks on the
wedding party as if she were compos-
ing a photogra|)h, and in the process
capttires her creator's worldview: "It was
an important picture, like a precise
instrtimenl of measurement: so much
duty, so much love, so much reckless
safety...."
That final oxymoron perfectly encap-
stilates the fundamental tensions (jf Gal-
lant's work, between atidacity and sliy-
ne.ss, insolence and politesse, openness
and stispicion, pride and |)reitidice.
From "Madeline's Birthday." the first
story that she published in The New
Yorker in 1950, ahottt an American girl
and a German boy adrift in a foster fam-
ily's fonntry house, to "In Plain Sight,'"
ptiblished in the same magazine last fall,
about a fading French writer and the
advances—and retreat—o( his tipstairs
mtise, all of Gallant's short stories con-
cern the barriers tbat sepaiate us and
the bridges, treacherous or untried, that
stand before tis to be crossed.
The first fonr stories in her new book,
which collects Gallant's work from 1980
to 1992, are set in Montreal, where Gal-
lant was born and raised, before making
her home in Paris in the '50s. They fol-
low the bereft women of the Carette
gradtialists have the advantage of having
a theory that is only a counierfactual.
The shock therapists, for their part, tried
and failed.
[A(;DISII BHAC.WATI is Arthur Lehman Pro-
fessor'of Fconomics at Columbia Univer-
sity. He is tbe atithor most recently of
India in Transition: Freeing the luonomy
{Oxford University Press).
family from 1933 to 1977 as the men in
their lives vanish or die. In "1933," the
just widowed Mme. Carette is forced to
move with her two young daughters,
Berthe, 6. and Marie, 4, to a smaller
apartmeni in the poor end of the city.
()n nioving day—the day when tbe
Carettes become "declasse" (the story's
original title)—"soft snow, like graying
lace, fell." Later to be tracked onto the
rtig by French and Irish alike, snow (in
Gallant's icy Mom real as in Joyce's
Dublin) is a leveler; general, it seems, all
over Canada. But it is, for (iallant, a lev-
eler o\' a bleaker sort—diity and end-
lessly melting—and it fails to bring her
solitary pilgrims into harmony with one ,
another.
Upstairs the French Mme. Carette
motirns her husband and her former
life, while downstairs the Irish {and
childless) Mme. (irosjean, the landlord's
wife—with whom Mme. Carette won't
deign to commtmicate—calls vainly into
the night for Arno, the Airedale whose
whereabouts are as unstire as her errant
htisband's. The pair have run off unan-
notinced to Pare Lafontiiine, the omni-
scient narrator soon reveals, where they
are "trying to play go-fetch-it in the
dark." For this is what Gallant's charac-
ters do: they repel and beckon one
another in a kind of half-light, passing
jtidgnient, making pronouncements and
tlien waiting, contrite, in the shadows,
hoping to regain their victims' sympa-
thy.
Himian interaction is plagued by mys-
tification and misinterpretation in Gal-
lant's short stories—as, indeed, are her
readers, who are alternately made to
feel that they are in the know and in the
dark. A master of shifting sympathies,
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